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Domicile is a term which is not easy of precise definition, but
one nevertheless with a real and well-understood legal meaning.
What of the term "matrimonial domicile"? Has it an equally
clear meaning, or an obscure one, or is it only a convenient
expression to describe the joint home of two persons joined in
wedlock? Courts and text-writers talk of "matrimonial domicile"
in two wholly different situations, and apparently it may mean a
different thing in each, for no reference is made in one connec-
tion to its use in the other. The law of the "matrimonial
domicile," it is said, determines the rights which are given the
parties to a marriage in the movable property of each other. The
phrase makes its second appearance when the question is raised
as to the validity of a divorce granted at the domicile of one of
the parties only, without personal service upon the other. The
significance of "matrimonial domicile" in marital property rights
will first be considered.
Suppose the easiest case. A of Iowa marries B of Iowa, and
after the marriage the spouses make their home there. There is;
of course, no difficulty with any question of domicile in this
situation. Both parties were domiciled in the state and remain
so afterwards. By the marriage, each is given such interest in
the movable property of the other as the law of Iowa, the domi-
cile, allows. It is, of course, immaterial where the marriage took
place. The question of "matrimonial" domicile as something
different from "actual" domicile is not brought up.
Now, let A the husband come from Illinois and B the wife be
an Iowa woman, and suppose by Illinois law the personal property
of the wife becomes the husband's upon marriage. Upon mar-
riage, B would take her husband's domicile, Illinois. She acquires
that domicile upon marriage, and the domicile's law gives A the
property. The result is not made any clearer by saying that the
law of the "matrimonial domicile" governs the property rights.
Illinois law governs because it is the husband's domicile which
becomes that of the wife. "Matrimonial domicile" might be used
here as a term of convenience to describe the place where the
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parties both have their home, but no added significance would be
given by its use.
While cases involving facts as simple as the two just put are
cited in proof of the general rule as to "matrimonial domicile,"
the real question of the existence of such a rule in this connection
is yet to be tested. The general statement of the doctrine is as
follows:
"The question as to what place is to be regarded as the
matrimonial domicile, the law of which will determine the
effect of the marriage upon personal property owned by
either party at the time, or subsequently acquired by either
or both during the existence of such domicile, is in its last
analysis one of the intention of the parties at the time of
the marriage as to where they shall establish their residence,
assuming that such intention is carried out within a reason-
able time. The various rules that have been adopted on
the subject are really rules for ascertaining that intention,
or for supplying, by presumption, the lack of any evidence
or other circumstances which will reveal it.
' 1
Now, if a "matrimonial domicile" is one to be established by
the intention of the parties, it differs greatly from domicile as that
term is ordinarily understood, which is established by the law.
The law says that every person must have a domicile because
certain rights and liabilities depend upon domicile. And while
the intention of the party is important in that the intention to
make a home in a place must coincide with his physical presence
there, no one would question that both elements are necessary to
make a legal domicile. A domicile can not ordinarily be estab-
lished by an intent alone, and it seems to be granted that in the
absence of evidence of intention to the contrary, the parties are
presumed to take the husband's domicile as their matrimonial
domicile. The general rule that intent alone is not sufficient is so
firmly established, that a statement that the parties to a marriage,
157 L. R. A. 360, n. See, for a general statement of the rule, 5
R. C. L. 10O7; 85 Am. St. Rep. 557; Story, Conflict of Laws (7th ed.)
sec. 186;. Wharton, Conflict of Laws (3d ed.) sec. igo. Cf. Westlake,
Private International Law (5th ed. 1912) 40. That something different
from ordinary domicile seems to be meant, is shown by the following note
in Parmele edition of Wharton, 4o3: "The previous domicile of the
parties seems to be entirely immaterial, except for the purpose of illus-
trating their intention as to the matrimonial domicile." The authorities
are fully discussed below.
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by mere intent, can make a "matrimonial domicile" in a place
which is the domicile of neither one of them, and have the law of
this place govern ownership in property, is to be regarded with
suspicion unless it finds adequate support in the authorities. The
prefix "matrimonial" would not, a priori, seem to have the magic
effect of upsetting a reasonable and well established rule govern-
ing the acquisition of a domicile.
Assume that the newly married pair intend to make an entirely
new home, as in the second case, where A of Illinois marries a
young woman who has been a resident of Iowa up to the time
of the marriage. The parties intend to live in Texas, where
neither one has ever been up to this time. Suppose they go
abroad on a trip before going to Texas. What are the rights in
each other's property? Determined by the law of the "matri-
monial domicile," the rule would say. But their matrimonial
domicile is not in Texas yet, for the intention must be carried out
within a "reasonable time." How long a trip can they take and
still come within the reasonable time rule? And if they overstay
the limit, what law will be found to have governed? Suppose
instead of going to Texas, A finds a better position in London,
and they settle there. Is this their "matrimonial domicile"? It
was not the one they had in mind at the time of the marriage.
If the wife had died before A got the London position, of how
much of B's personal property owned by her at the time of the
marriage had he become the owner so that it would not pass by
descent? The answer to these questions without any doctrine of
"matrimonial domicile" is simple enough. When A married B,
the wife took A's Illinois domicile. His domicile remained in
Illinois after they were married, because he had never established
a new one, even though he had given up Illinois as his home. He
got by the marriage such interest in her movable property as the
law of Illinois gave. If they do go to Texas and acquire prop-
erty there, or do live in London and acquire it, the law of Texas
or of England will govern the marital rights in those acquisi-
tions-nothing is left in abeyance awaiting the fulfillment of their
intentions.
The test case, then, is the one where the intended domicile of
the parties differs from that of the husband at the time of the
marriage. Unless the authorities expressly cover such a case, is
it not fair to say that the term "matrimonial domicile" is one of
convenience only and means nothing more than the husband's
domicile which the wife takes upon marriage?
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As might be expected, the courts in their general statements on
the doctrine of "matrimonial domicile" have been greatly
influenced by Mr. Justice Story's discussion of "the rule of the
true matrimonial domicile."'2 The learned author puts the case,
"suppose a man domiciled in Massachusetts should marry a lady
domiciled in Louisiana, what is to be deemed the matrimonial
domicile?" "Foreign jurists," he says, "would answer that it is
the domicile of the husband, if the intention of the parties is to fix
their residence there; and of the wife, if the intention is to
fix their residence there; and if the residence is intended to be in
some other place, as in New York, then the matrimonial domicile
would be in New York. . . . The same doctrine," continues
judge Story, "has been repeatedly acted on by the supreme court
of Louisiana." He summarizes thus:
"Under these circumstances, when there is such a general
consent of foreign jurists to the doctrine thus recognized
in America, it is not perhaps too much to affirm that a con-
trary doctrine will scarcely hereafter be established. .. ."
The Louisiana cases cited by the author are LeBreton v.
Nouchet3 and Ford's Curator v. Ford.4 Because they are put
forth here as the only American cases on the doctrine, and
because they are frequently cited in this connection, they are
worth stating in some detail.
In the LeBreton case, the defendant and the daughter of the
plaintiff, both evidently domiciled in New Orleans, ran away and
were married in Mississippi, returning to New Orleans a few
weeks thereafter and remaining there until the wife died. The
mother of the deceased sued the defendant to recover property
owned by the daughter prior to her marriage. By Mississippi
law, all personal property of a woman went to her husband upon
marriage, and the defendant claimed that his rights were gov-
erned by the law. He was allowed to retain only the marital
portion given by the law of Louisiana. It is to be noted in this
case that the parties were originally domiciled in New Orleans.
While there was evidence that the husband had expressed an
intention to make a home in Mississippi, the court thought this
evidence was "insufficient to counterbalance the weight of the
Story, op. cit. secs. IgI-Ig9.
s (i83 La.) 3 Martin 60, 5 Am. Dec. 736.
'(1824 La.) 2 Martin N. S. 574, 14 Am. Dec. 2oi.
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facts which disclose the real intention of the parties." LeBreton
v. Notchet presents no difficulty. Both parties started with a
Louisiana domicile and kept it throughout. The husband got
such rights in the wife's property upon marriage as Louisiana
law gave him. There is not even talk in the case which supports
argument for an intended "matrimonial," as distinct from an
actual, domicile.
Ford's Curator v. Ford is just as simple. Mrs. Ford before
her marriage had lived in Mississippi with her brother. The
intended husband had a furnished house and a farm in Louisiana,
and the day after the marriage, which took place in Mississippi,
the parties left for Louisiana. The question in the case was the
ownership of certain movable property owned by the wife before
her marriage. If Mississippi law governed, the husband would
have become the owner. The court said the question was whether
the matrimonial rights of the wife were to be regulated according
to the laws of the place in which the marriage was contracted, or
those of the intended domicile of the spouses. It is held that
Louisiana law governed, and it is clear that this is correct. It
would have been equally clear even without evidence of the wife's
expressed intention of going to Louisiana to live and her carry-
ing out that intention after marriage. The wife took the hus-
band's domicile upon marriage, and this would have been equally
true even had she not gone to his home to live with him.5
The court made the following statement, which is the closest
thing there is in either case to support the suggestion of Judge
Story:
"We think, however, that it may be safely laid down as
a principle, that the matrimonial rights of a wife, who, as
in the present case, marries with the intention of an instant
removal, for residence in another state, are to be regulated
by the laws of her intended domicile."
It is not denied that there are to be found in the books state-
ments which directly or by inference recognize the rule which
Judge Story predicted would become the recognized American
doctrine, though they are fewer in number than the imposing
array of citations in some of the authorities already quoted would
lead one to expect. In most of the cases, the "matrimonial"
' See authorities cited by Professor Joseph H. Beale in his article, The
Domicile of a Married Woman (1917) 2 So. LAw QuAtR. 93, 96.
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domicile was no more than that of the husband at the time of
marriage.6 Others of the decisions do not involve any question
of "matrimonial" domicile at all but merely cite the rule given by
Story in the course of the discussion,7 or state it generally." It will
be seen from the cases cited that most of the recognition of the
doctrine has come from the Louisiana court. This is indeed the
only place where it has been enunciated repeatedly and clearly.*
The civil law writers referred to by judge Story have doubtless
had influence here.
The only case directly raising the point at issue is McIntyre v.
Chappell.10 Husband and wife, both being residents of Ten-
nessee, were married in that state. Previous to, and at the
time of, their marriage they had the intention of removing to
Texas. Two weeks after the marriage the husband went to
Texas with some negroes, improved the land, planted a crop, and
the next year moved to Texas with his wife. The dispute in the
case was over the ownership of certain slaves. They were claimed
for the child of the parties, as sole owner, by right of inheritance
from the father, and for the wife it was claimed they were com-
Jaffray v. McGough (1888) 83 Ala. 202, 3 So. 594; Mason v. Fuller
(1869) 36 Conn. 16o; Parrett v. Palmer (1893) 8 Ind. App. 356, 35 N. E.
713, 52 Am. St. Rep. 479; Townes v. Durbin (1861 Ky.) 3 Metc. 352,
77 Am. Dec. 176; Routh v. Routh (1844 La.) 9 Rob. 224, 41 Am. Dec. 326;
Fisher v. Fisher (1847) 2 La. Ann. 774; Walker v. Duverger (1849) 4
La. Ann. 569; Hayden v. Nutt (1849) 4 La. Ann. 65; Percy v. Percy
(1854) 9 La. Ann. 185; Connor v. Connor (1855) io La. Ann. 44o;
Arendell v. Arendell (1855) io La. Ann. 566; Mason v. Homer (187o)
io5 Mass. 116; Harral v. Harral (1884) 39 N. J. Eq. 279, 51 Am. Rep. 17;
Kneeland v. Ensley (1838 Tenn.) Meigs, 620, 33 Am. Dec. 168; Layne v.
Pardee (1852 Tenn.) 2 Swan, 232.
"Long v. Hess (1895) 154 Ill. 482, 40 N. E. 335, 45 Am. St. Rep. 143;
Fuss v. Fuss (1869) 24 Wis. 256, I Am. Rep. i8o.
'Re Hernandez's Succession (1894) 46 La. Ann. 962, 15 So. 461, 24
L. R. A. 831.
" Thus, in Arendell v. Arendell, supra, the following charge of the trial
court to the jury was approved by the supreme court: "It may, as it often
does, occur, that the husband has no residence, or having one, it is the
intention of the parties previous, and at the time of their marriage, to
fix the matrimonial domicile in some other state. Cases of this sort are
governed by the well recognized principle of law, that the laws of the
intended domicile of the husband are to govern the rights of the parties.
In such cases, the jury should be well satisfied, that the parties at the time
of the marriage, intended to fix their matrimonial domicile elsewhere, and
that that intention was actually carried into effect"
" (1849) 4 Tex. 187.
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munity property in which she had a half interest. The trial
court instructed (p. 93) :
"That if the jury believed that the parties intended to
remove to Texas at the time of their marriage, and imme-
diately did remove to Texas, their respective rights must
be determined according to the laws of Texas."
Of this instruction the supreme court said:
"The national domicile of these parties was, we think,
unquestionably, in the state of Tennessee; and we are
aware of no principle which, under the circumstances,
would justify the conclusion that their matrimonial domi-
cile was elsewhere . . . . We conclude that the matri-
monial domicile of the parties to this marriage was in the
state of Tennessee, and that previous to the acquisition of
a domicile, facto et animo, by the husband in this country
the laws of that state must furnish the rule of decision as
to their marital rights. . . . In its application to the facts
of this case, we therefore, conclude that the instruction in
question was erroneous."
The ruling on this point was not essential to the determination of
the case, and this the court admits."' But the question was pre-
sented by the record, was the point principally discussed in argu-
ment, and counsel concurred in expressing a desire that it be
decided. It is of a wholly different kind of authority than a broad
general statement where the exact point is not before the court.' 2
McIntyre v. Chappel was doubted in a later Texas decision.13
This case is a good one to show how the facts of many of the
cases lie close to the question which will test the correctness of
the quoted rule, but not quite touch it. The contest was over the
ownership of a slave-by the laws of Texas, movable property-
which was levied on as the property of Barrow and claimed by his
wife as her separate property. Husband and wife had resided in
Mississippi, but had decided to move to Texas. While visiting
'As the learned judge points out, the verdict was against the law and
the evidence and a new trial should have been granted, for the community
law in any event would not have applied to this property.
ISays the editor of the 3d edition of Wharton, Conflict of Laws, Vol. I,
403 n.: "It is somewhat singular that, in the only case in which it appeared
that the intention was to establish a matrimonial domicile at a place other
than the previous domicile of either party, the applicability of the rule
was denied."
"State v. Barrow (1855) i5 Tex. x79, 65 Am. Dec. iog.
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Mrs. Barrow's parents in Tennessee, evidently while on their way
to Texas, Mrs. Barrow's father gave her the slave in controversy
for her own exclusive use and benefit. The Barrows took the
slave directly to Texas. If Tennessee law governed, the slave
became the husband's property; if Texas law, or Mississippi law,
the separate property of the wife. The court said the question
was whether Tennessee or Texas law was applicable, and held
that the Texas law applied, evidently because the parties having
intended to become domiciled in Texas must be deemed to have
intended Texas law to govern future acquisitions. The Missis-
sippi law, however, was in evidence. Applying the general
principle that the former domicile was not lost until a new one
was acquired, the law of Mississippi would govern, and the result
of the case would be the same-the wife would get the slave.
The court recognized this.
Professor Dicey defines a "matrimonial" domicile14 as that of
the husband at the time of the marriage, with a query whether the
intended domicile is included under English law. As he says:
c . * . On the theory . . . of a tacit contract between
the parties about to marry, that their mutual property
rights shall be determined by the law of their matrimonial
domicile, the extension of the term so as to include the
country in which they intend to become, and do become,
domiciled immediately after their marriage seems to be
reasonable."
This tacit contract theory is discussed below. Westlake' seems
to be more sure of this point. Wharton on Conflicts-8 believes
that the "matrimonial" domicile is the" intended permanent resi-
dence, but Minor'7 very vigorously and, it is submitted, correctly,
says:
"to hold that country where the husband intends to settle
(the factumn not combining with the animus) to be his
domicile, whether 'matrimonial' or otherwise, is violative
of one of the leading principles governing the acquisition
of a domicile of choice."
judge Story gives two grounds for his "matrimonial domicile"
rule :18
14Conflict of Laws (2d ed. 19o8) 5H.
Op. cit. sec. 4o.
" (3d ed.) sec. i9o.
'Conflict of Laws, sec. 81.
' Op. cit. sec. 199.
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"Treated as a matter to be governed by the municipal
law to which the parties were or meant to be subjected by
their future domicile, the doctrine seems . . . capable of
solid vindication."
This seems pure assertion, for no explanation is given of the way
the municipal law can affect matters before the actual domicile
is fixed there; and this is the very point to be established.
The second reason suggested is that of a tacit matrimonial con-
tract. To this the author seems to incline, for stating his belief
as to what the accepted doctrine will be, he adds:
"for in England as well as in America, in the interpreta-
tion of other contracts, the law of the place where they
are to be performed has been held to govern."'91
Stating the argument a little more fully: A and B are to be
joined in wedlock. They might have contracted expressly with
reference to rights in property owned by them at the time
or thereafter to be acquired ;20 but because they enter into no
express contract, we will say that they tacitly contracted with
reference to marital rights in property by accepting the provisions
of the law in that respect. "The tacit contract is to be construed
precisely as if the laws of the place were inserted in it.' '21 And
imputing further intentions to the parties, we can say they tacitly
contracted according to the provisions of the law where they were
going to live. This would be allowed either on the theory that
the parties intended to be governed by this law in making their
contract,22 or that it was the place of performance.
23
The doctrine of tacit contract seems to have found favor with
European writers, and is not without support in the authorities
in common-law jurisdictions.
2 4
'But elsewhere judge Story does not appear to approve of the doctrine
of tacit consent as regulating the rights and duties of matrimony. See
Story, op. cit. sec. 19o.
2' Note that such an agreement is not a part of the marriage contract
at all, but a wholly different one.
Castro v. Illies (1858) 22 Tex. 479, 73 Am. Dec. 277, 283.
""As the contract of marriage was entered into and solemnized with
the intention that it should be performed and fulfilled in the state of
Connecticut . . ." Mason v. Fuller (1869) 36 Conn. x6o, 162.
'Authority may be found for either or both of these views as to the
law governing the validity of contracts. See articles discussing the sub-
ject by Professor Joseph H. Beale (igog) 23 I-Av. L. REv. 79, i94, 26o.
' See Story, op. cit. sec. 147 et seq.; Wharton, Conflict of Laws (3d ed.)
i9o; Westlake, Private International Law (5th ed.), 74 et seq. In Besse
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The whole argument seems to go at the question the wrong
way. Calling a marriage a contract does not solve the legal puz-
zle of the relationships arising therefrom. It is true that people
get into the married state via the contract route. But, once in,
there is a relationship created which is much more than a matter
of contract, and which depends for its rights and duties not upon
the consent of either of the parties, but upon the authority of
the law. Would it be argued that the common-law right of a
husband to discipline his wife with a stick no bigger than his
thumb was a matter of tacit consent between the spouses? The
right of control over the wife's person seems clearly a right given
by law as an incident of the marital status, but hardly more clearly
than the right of curtesy in her reality and ownership of her
chattels, and the power to reduce her choses in action to posses-
sion. Any explanation of marital rights on the basis of a tacit
contract flies in the face of the facts. Laymen generally know
very little about the law until they get involved in a lawsuit, and
two young people anxious to wed do not sit up nights reading up
on the law of marital property. They probably know very little
about it, and what knowledge they do have is of the most general
and indefinite kind. For the common law to give the husband
all the wife's persondl property, and then say that the reason is
because the wife tacitly contracted to give it, is adding insult to
injury.
A tacit agreement, if real, ought still to apply when the parties
move from their first marital home to another jurisdiction and
there acquire property; but there is ample authority that in such
a case, the first law no longer applies, and the law of the new
domicile governs.2 5 The tacit agreement, if there were such a
v. Pellochoux (1874) 73 Ill. 285, 292, the court says: "In all marriages,
the parties may be presumed to tacitly adopt the laws of their domicile,
and to agree to be governed by them, but the obligation will be limited by
the extent of these laws."
"Saul v. His Creditors (827 La.) 5 Martin N. S. 569, 2 Beale, Cas. on
Conflict of Laws, 220 and cases cited; Wharton, op. cit. sec. 191; Story,
op. cit. sec. 178; 57 L. R A. 366, n. The contrary seems to have been
held in an English case, De Nicols v. Curlier (1899, H. Lords) [igoo] A. C.
21. The case is stated in Westlake, op. cit. 79: "The consorts, both French
by nationality and domiciled, were married in France without express
contract, and therefore under the system of community. They removed
to England, where the husband was naturalized, and where they amassed
by their industry a large fortune, of which a part was invested in English
freeholds and leaseholds and a part remained in money and securities.
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thing, ought to apply to land as well as to personalty; but rights in
land acquired by parties upon marriage are governed by the law
of the situs of the land.
2 8
"Matrimonial domicile" may be used as a term of convenience
to designate the domicile of the husband which the wife assumes
upon marriage ;27 but as used to describe a place where an actual
domicile has not been established, the doctrine seems utterly
opposed to settled common-law rules of domicile, whatever may
be -said for it under any other system of law. It is not established
by conclusive authority. The repeated citation of the language
of Judge Story seems another case where the shadow of a great
name has darkened the clearness of judicial expression.
II
What is "matrimonial domicile" in a divorce suit? The term
is a recent one in this branch of law. Writers on conflict of laws
do not use it; nor do the standard writers on domestic relations;
nor is it taken over in this connection from the cases involving
rights in marital property, for no mention of these cases is made
in this connection, nor does the suggestion of "matrimonial"
The husband having died, leaving a will by which he had disposed of the
whole as though he were sole owner, the widow claimed her share as of
a community, and the House of Lords decided unanimously in her favor
as to the personal chattels, which alone were before it." Mr. Baty, in
Polarized Law, 96, explains the case by saying that it proceeded solely on
the finding that the settlement made by Fr.nch law for the parties must
be held equivalent to an express contract by them to adopt it. "As foreign
law is a matter of fact, it may in the future fail to be shown even for
France; and certainly it may fail to be shown in the case of other
countries." Cf. Dicey, Conflict of Laws (2d ed.) 511-14.
"Story, op. cit. sec. 159; Minor, op. cit. sec. 8o; 57 L. R. A. 353, n.
In De Nicols v. Curlier [goo] 2 Ch. 41o, Kekewich, 3. applied the con-
tract made for the parties by the French code to interests in land in
England. The decision seems a clear error, but Westlake, op. cit. 81,
approves the result believing "the doctrine of tacit contract on marriage
to be well founded, and that the unity of the matrimonial system of prop-
erty generally coincides best with the wishes of persons who, by not
entering into an express contract, show they do not desire complicated
or unusual arrangements."
I just why the first home of the parties is any more "matrimonial" than
one to which they subsequently remove is not clear, but the distinction
seems to be made. See Wharton, op. cit. sec. x19; Story, op. cit. sec. 178.
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domicile as an intended domicile ever appear in cases of this kind.
It is not found in the digests. Only in a very recent work does
the term appear,28 and its use therein is evidently based on the
language of the courts in late cases, without additional definition
of meaning.
A "matrimonial" domicile for the purpose of divorce, as some-
thing different from the actual domicile of husband or wife,
gained for a time some recognition in the Scotch cases. In Jack
v. Jack29 there was held to be jurisdiction to grant a divorce tQ a
husband who had formerly lived in Scotland with his wife, even
though it was admitted in his pleading that he had been for some
time a minister of the gospel in the state of New York, without
any present intention of returning. The theory the court went on
was that the "matrimonial domicile" of the pair was still in
Scotland. Lord Neaves said :0
"Perhaps, individually speaking, [the husband] may be
domiciled in America. But the question still arises,
whether, as regards the Married pair, the matrimonial
domicile, as it may be called, has been transferred from
Scotland to any other country. ... "
And the meaning of "matrimonial domicile" was explained by
the Lord Justice Clerk :" -
"It would seem, then, that the place of residence of the
married pair for the time is the place where jurisdiction
ought to be found to give redress for conjugal infidelity,
without inquiring whether the husband's domicile of suc-
cession may be in .another country. . . . The place of
residence has appropriately been called the domicile of the
marriage."
Lord Deas, however, characterizes the use of the term "matri-
monial domicile" as misleading, figurative and wanting in judicial
precision:
"Domicile belongs exclusively to persons. Having
ascertained the domicile of the husband, and the domicile
of the wife, the inquiry into domicile is exhausted."
.9 t C. L. 51o, 512.
(1862) 24 Ct. Sess. 2d Ser. 467.10 Ibid. p. 476.
' Ibid. p. 483.
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The conception of the "matrimonial domicile" as a temporary
home of husband and wife was again brought out in Pitt V. Pitt.82
The Lord Justice-Clerk said :33
"The pursuer's English domicile of origin might subsist
for many purposes, and yet he might be domiciled in this
country so as to give jurisdiction to a Scotch Consistorial
Court."
And Lord Cowan itated that
". .. it does not require to be shewn that the domicile
to found jurisdiction is the paramount and real domicile of
the parties, or, in other words, the domicile for governing
succession; but that the essential matter to be investigated
in each case is the matrimonial domicile-the residence
of the married pair-where, as their home, they live and
cohabit, or ought to live and cohabit, as man and wife."
Pitt v. Pitt was reversed in the House of Lords.8 4 The validity
of the doctrine of "matrimonial domicile" as a basis for jurisdic-
tion was not settled, as the eminent counsel for the respondent, Sir
R. Phillmore and Sir Hugh Cairns, abandoned the ground as
untenable, a concession suggested by the Lord Chancellor to
"be quite in accordance with the law of the case."1
35
But in Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier6 where the question was
considered by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the
conclusion on the point was that "the domicile for the time being
of the married pair affords the only true test of jurisdiction to
dissolve their marriage." Lord Watson said:
... any judicial definition of matrimonial domicile
which has hitherto been -attempted has been singularly
wanting in precision, and not in the least calculated to
produce a uniform result. . . . The introduction of so
loose a rule into the jus gentium would, in all probability,
lead to an inconvenient variety of practice, and would
occasion the very conflict which it is the object of interna-
tional jurisprudence to prevent."
(1862) I Ct. Sess. 3d Ser. io6.
"Ibid. p. 117.
(864) 4 Macqueen, App. Cas. 627.
See also, Niboyet v. Niboyet (1878 Ct App.) L. R 4 P. D. i.
(Priv. Counc.) [1895] A. C. 517, 540, 538.
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Yet, in the two famous cases -of Atherton v. Atherton"' and
Haddock v. Haddock"8 the fact that a decree of divorce was or
was not given by the court of the "matrimonial" domicile was
made the turning point as to whether a second state must, under
the "due faith and credit" clause, recognize the validity of such
a decree given in the absence of the defendant. It would be
affectation of learning to go over the ground covered by these
and similar cases, in the light of the voluminous discussion of the
subject by capable commentators. The one point we want to
find is the difference between a "matrimonial" domicile and any
other kind of domicile.89 The Atherton case was said in Had-
dock v. Haddock to have been expressly decided on the ground
that the "matrimonial" domicile of the parties was in Kentucky.
This was what, in the mind of the court, made the difference;
and that is all the help on the point given by the Supreme Court
cases, except that in a later decision the Atherton case was fol-
lowed on similar facts.
4 0
(igoi) 181 U. S. '55.
(i9o6) 2oi U. S. 562.
It will be remembered that in Atherton v. Atherton the parties were
married in New York and immediately took up their residence in Ken-
tucky. Here the husband, after his wife had left him, had secured a
divorce in accordance with the regular Kentucky procedure on the ground
of desertion. Later, Atherton was made the defendant in an action for
limited divorce in New York, the state to which his wife had returned;
and it was there decided that the Kentucky decree was inoperative in
New York, and the wife was given the decree prayed for. The United
States Supreme Court held this a violation of due faith and credit to the
Kentucky divorce. Mr. Justice Gray, in delivering the opinion, cautiously
limited the holding to the facts before the court, and pointed out that
Kentucky was the "only matrimonial domicile of the husband and wife."
In Haddock v. Haddock, the parties were married in New York; Haddock
went to Connecticut and secured a divorce there on the ground of deser-
tion. The wife remained in New York, and having brought suit for
limited divorce, Haddock set up the Connecticut decree. Judgment wag
given for Mrs. Haddock, however, and this was held to be no violation
of due faith and credit.
' Thompson v. Thompson (1913) 226 U. S. 55i. The parties were
married and lived in Virginia, where the husband had secured a limited
divorce on the ground of desertion. When the wife sued in the District
of Columbia, after having made her residence there, it was held that due
faith and credit required recognition of the Virginia decree. "It is clear,
therefore, under the decision in the Atherton case, and the principles upon
which it rests, that the state of Virginia had jurisdiction, and the proper
courts- of that state could proceed to adjudicate respecting it upon
grounds recognized by the laws of that state," said the Court. The point
was not further discussed.
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It has been contended that a "matrimonial domicile" is not
simply the common domicile of husband and wife, but is "that
place where one spouse is rightfully domiciled and where the
other ought to be to fulfill the marital obligations."141 It is believed
that there would be great difficulty in making this test work.
Where ought a husband to be to fulfill his marital obligations?
Anywhere, surely. If he has treated his wife with such cruelty
that she has been compelled to leave him, his fault is not that he
is living in the wrong place, but that he did not behave properly
at home. Even if the husband deserts, his wrong is not in
going to a new place to live-that is proper enough; the miscon-
duct is in abandoning his wife. In Atherton v. Atherton, the
New York court found that the wife had left the husband through
no fault of hers, and was therefore rightfully domiciled in New
York. The same must have been found in Thompson v. Thomp-
son; yet in each of those cases the decree secured by the husband
in the state where the parties had lived together, and where the
husband still was living, was conclusive. If the test suggested is
what determines "matrimonial domicile," why was it not open to
the New York or District of Columbia court to find, as they did,
that the wife was rightfully domiciled within the jurisdiction, and
why would not that finding be material?
It has also been suggested that the "matrimonial domicile" is
something that stays with a party who is abandoned or who is not
in fAult, so long as he or she stays within the jurisdiction where
the parties had their common domicile, but that such innocent
party can move to another jurisdiction and the "matrimonial
domicile" will go along.42 If the husband and wife lived in
Mexico, for instance, as in the Montmorency case, and he aban-
doned his wife there, the matrimonial domicile stays with her, and
she could transfer it to Texas by going to that state to live. But
if this were so, why could not the wife in Atherton v. Atherton
or in Thompson v. Thompson show that she had been wronged,
and that when she took up a residence apart from her husband,
the "matrimonial domicile" went with her? That is just what
she could not do in either one of those cases.
From the language of the judges in the Supreme Court deci-
sions mentioned, it would seem that a "matrimonial domicile" is
' Robert J. Peaslee, Ex Parte Divorce (1915) 28 HAwv. L. REv. 457,
469.
' 2Montmorency v. Montmorency (igii Tex. Ct. of Civ. App.) 139 S. W.
1168. See also Parker v. Parker (igi5 C. C. A. 5 C.) 2 Fed. 186, 137
C. C. A. 626.
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regarded as nothing more than the place where husband and wife
have their common domiciles,"3 and the use of the term in several
recent decisions seems to indicate that this is the sense in which
it is used." "Where parties are married out of the state but come
to reside in the state afterwards, [they] thus establish a domicile
of matrimony therein." 45 Applying this simple definition to the
matter under discussion, namely, the use of the term in divorce
proceedings, "matrimonial domicile" would, of course, mean the
place where the parties last lived as husband and wife with the
intent of making that place their home. 8 This too, is the natural
meaning of the term. It seems neither necessary nor desirable
to make further complications in an already tangled question by
ascribing to these words a more difficult meaning.
It may well be that the introduction of this term into the law
of divorce was a judicial mistake, "that what in the Atherton
case .. .was referred to out of abundant caution .. .was later
seized upon, in the Haddock case, . ..and .. . invested with
magical qualities it did not, and does not possess.' 47  Perhaps
too, it works injustice.48 In the years since Haddock v. Haddock
was decided, it has not become any easier to "see any ground for
distinguishing between the extent of jurisdiction in the matri-
monial domicile and that .. . in a domicile later acquired;"4 but
such a distinction has been made by a court from which there is no
appeal in this world, has been taken up by lesser tribunals, an4 has
vitally affected the people whose rights have been decided under
"The headnote in the Thompson case says: "The state in which the
parties were married, and where they reside after marriage, and where
the husband resided until the action for divorce was brought, is the
matrimonial domicile. . . ." In Atherton v. Atherton the marriage took
place in New York.
"Perkins v. Perkins (1916) 225 Mass. 82, X13 N. E. 841; Callahan v.
Callahan (I9o9) 65 Misc. Rep. 172, 121 N. Y. Supp. 39; Hall v. Hall
(igio) 139 App. Div. i2o, 123 N. Y. Supp. IO56; Benham v. Benham
(I9io) 69 Misc. Rep. 442, 125 N. Y. Supp. 923; People v. Catlin (igio)
69 Misc. Rep. 191, 126 N. Y. Supp. 350; Post v. Post (i91) 71 Misc. Rep.
44, 129 N. Y. Supp. 754; State ex rel. Aldrach v. Morse (19o6) 31 Utah
213, 87 Pac. 705, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1127. See also (I915) 4 CAL. L. Rxv.
59,2 BENCH AND B A 37.
"State ex rel. Aldrach v. Morse, supra.
'Callahan v. Callahan, supra.
'2 BENCH AND BAR 37, 41.
See (198) 21 HARv. L. REv. 296.
'Holmes, J., dissenting, in Haddock v. Haddock, supra. See also,
Andrews, J., in Callahan v. Callahan, supra.
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it. Civilization has not come to an end, but human happiness of
individuals has been made or marred by it. Unless the doctrine
is soon repudiated, it bids fair to become permanently fixed in the
law. The real difficulty seems to be not in the term "matrimonial
domicile," but in the erroneous rule of law which has been
supported by reliance upon it.
